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Abstract
A new e-Marketing contract structure is proposed, where the contract would be ex-
changed between an e-Marketing company, named Company X, and a manufacturing
company, named Company Y, which is to promote Product Z within a group of SNSs
(Social Network Services). Company X promises Company Y to generate Q positive
comments about Product Z within SNSs, and then hires K bloggers, asking them
to experience Product Z and write comments about it. They are expected to play a
role of pumping water so as to fulﬁll the contract. Each of such bloggers is paid by
$c. For this service, Company Y pays Company X by the amount of $®Q. Should
the actual number of positive comments exceed Q, the additional payment of $¯
for each positive comment beyond Q would be paid to Company X by Company Y.
For controlling the risk of the actual number of positive comments to appear within
SNSs falling below Q, Company X pays the penalty of $° for each shortage below Q.
The problem for Company X is then how to determine Q and K so as to optimize
its objective. Two types of problems are considered, where the ﬁrst problem is to
maximize the expected proﬁt of Company X while the second problem is based on
the VaR (Value at Risk) approach to minimize the probability of the proﬁt of Com-
pany X falling below v0 subject to having the expected proﬁt above v1. Although
this problem has a ﬂavor of the classical news vendor problem, it is more diﬃcult
because of its two dimensional nature. For the ﬁrst problem, the exact optimal so-
lution is derived apart from the integer constraints and an algorithmic procedure is
developed for computing the optimal solution. For the second problem, it is shown
that the distribution function of the proﬁt of Company X can be given explicitly,
thereby providing a computational foundation for solving the problem. Numerical
examples are given, illustrating the stochastic structure of the e-Marketing contract
and the diﬀerences of the optimal strategies for the two problems.
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1 Introduction
In its infancy, the Internet provided the worldwide network infrastructure through
which corporations could propagate information of their choice with speed and cost-
performance eﬃciency. The broadcasting approach for one way communication to
the market could be combined with the one-on-one approach for two way commu-
nication by utilizing open websites equipped with two way mail services and the
like. On the other hand, the use of the Internet by consumers was somewhat limited
to information search and purchasing. Since the beginning of this century, how-
ever, the Internet has entered a new era, which is often referred to as Web 2.0 and
after, where a new generation of digital devices, mobile devices and common soft-
ware would play a critical role. As Werbach [16] pointed out,“ The basics of the
new today are that powerful digital devices are becoming pervasive and inexpensive;
they’re becoming commodities. Services are available networked across the Internet
and use common software. The world is heterogeneous, complex and decentralized.”
Supported by such devices and services, Web 2.0 has impacted the way businesses
are conducted in every industrial segment, and perhaps, has aﬀected the area of
marketing most signiﬁcantly where Consumer Generated Media (CGM) has become
the focal attention.
In traditional marketing, the classic AIDMA model by Hall [10] has been playing
a central role in describing the psychological process of a consumer toward purchas-
ing a product. Here, a product would ﬁrst attract“Attention” of a consumer, and
then the consumer would become“ Interested”. Soon the consumer might“Desire”
to have the product and keep it in his“Memory”. Finally, upon coming across
the product at a store, the consumer would take an“ Action” to purchase it. In
response to the era of Web 2.0, Dentsu Incorporated, the largest advertising agency
in Japan, proposed a new model called AISAS by modifying the AIDMA model in
the following manner. As for the AIDMA model, a product would ﬁrst attract“At-
tention” of a consumer, and then the consumer would become“ Interested”. The
next action of the consumer in the AISAS model would be to“Search” information
through the Internet, followed by taking an“ Action” to purchase it. In this new
model, the consumer behavior does not stop here and the actions by consumers to
“Share” experiences and assessments through the Internet would be emphasized. In
June 2005, Dentsu Incorporated registered AISAS as its trademark. This episode
symbolizes the importance of CGM in the era of Web 2.0.
As the market became heterogeneous, complex and decentralized, CGM became
extremely important in marketing even outside the Internet. Since the middle of
1990’s, the study of WOM (Word of Mouth) has become prevalent in the literature.
Ellison and Fudenberg [5], for example, proposed a WOM communication model
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and analyzed its implications. Bone [3] examined the eﬀects of WOM on decision
of consumers for purchasing a product. Goldenberg, Libai and Muller [9] claimed
that the eﬀects of WOM would depend on the level of closeness of those involved in
WOM. More recently, in Banerjee and Fudenberg [2], a new model was developed
for measuring the eﬀects of WOM. Along with this line of research on oﬄine WOM,
WOM through the Internet, which is often called eWOM, has began to attract atten-
tion of more researchers. Shardanand and Maes [13] oﬀered an information ﬁltering
algorithm so as to identify preferences of consumers from WOM and then to provide
personalized recommendations. Stauss [14, 15] discussed potential threats and op-
portunities resulting from online articulations by consumers. Balasubramanian and
Mahajan [1] provided a conceptual framework for describing three types of social
interaction utility within a virtual community: focus related utility, consumption
utility, and approval utility. Based on this framework, Henning-Thurau, Gwinner,
Walsh, and Gremler examined an online sample of some 2000 consumers, and derived
key elements for motivating consumers to participate in eWOM. Dellarocas [4] dis-
cussed potentials and diﬃculties of online feedback mechanisms for the digitization
of eWOM.
In practice, several e-Marketing companies in Japan seem to be well ahead of
the literature by taking advantage of CGM and eWOM. Companies such as Fore-
front Systems [7], Global Insight [8], and FC2 [6] oﬀer points to bloggers for writing
comments on selected products and services. These points may be accumulated to
a certain level at which they can be cashed. Mobile Agent [12] openly arranges
advertising clients and bloggers through its website where similar points would be
given to bloggers for writing their blogs. This kind of marketing is sometimes called
“ stealth marketing” and is despised by certain marketing organizations. Word of
Mouth Marketing Association [17], for example, strongly opposes to stealth market-
ing. Google is believed to lower the ranking of any website if the website becomes
known to be involved in stealth marketing supported by payment.
While the practices of the above Japanese corporations may face the danger
of committing to unethical business conducts, e-Marketing based on hired bloggers
itself may not be necessarily evil as long as the following conditions are met: 1) the
relationship between an advertising client, an e-Marketing company, and bloggers,
who may be hired for writing comments about products and services selected by the
advertising client, would be managed through contracts in a manner transparent
between the involved parties; 2) the hired bloggers would actually experience the
selected products and services, and then write their honest comments about them; 3)
such a comment should state the fact that the comment is written for payment and 4)
should such comments be screened by the advertising client and/or the e-Marketing
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company, this fact should become publicly known. When a TV advertisement shows
a next-door housewife praising a detergent, the TV audience would know that she
would be paid but still might be aﬀected. Similar marketing eﬀorts through eWOM
should be tolerated as long as the above conditions are met, thereby making such
marketing eﬀorts no longer be stealthy.
To the best knowledge of the authors, no research has been done in the literature
concerning possible contracts for e-Marketing as discussed above. The purpose of
this paper is to develop a new e-Marketing contract structure based on consumer-
generated contents from a point of view of an e-Marketing company, and analyze
its stochastic properties for managing risks involved. More speciﬁcally, we consider
a contract model between Company X specializing in e-Marketing and Company Y
trying to promote Product Z. Through the contract, Company X promises Company
Y to generate Q positive comments about Product Z written by consumers in their
blogs within speciﬁc SNSs (Social Network Services) during a certain period. In
return, Company Y pays Company X by the amount of $®Q. Company X hires K
bloggers, asking them to experience Product Z and write comments about it. They
are expected to play a role of pumping water so as to fulﬁll the contract. Each
of such bloggers is paid by $c. If the actual number of positive comments exceeds
Q, Company Y compensates Company X by paying $¯ for each comment above Q.
Should it fall below Q, Company X pays the penalty of $° to Company Y for each
shortage below Q. The problem for Company X is then how to determine Q and K
so as to optimize its objective. Two types of problems are considered, where the ﬁrst
problem is to maximize the expected proﬁt of Company X while the second problem
is based on the VaR (Value at Risk) approach which minimizes the probability of
the proﬁt of Company X falling below v0 subject to having the expected proﬁt above
v1. Although this problem has a ﬂavor of the classical news vendor problem, it is
more diﬃcult because of its two dimensional nature.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, a new e-Marketing contract
model is introduced and the two types of decision problems are formulated formally.
Section 3 is devoted to analysis of the optimal strategy for maximizing the expected
proﬁt of Company X, where the exact optimal solution is derived apart from the
integer constraints and an algorithmic procedure is developed for computing the
optimal solution. In Section 4, the optimal strategy based on the VaR approach is
discussed. It is shown that the distribution function of the proﬁt of Company X
can be given explicitly, thereby providing a computational foundation for solving
the problem. Numerical examples are given in Section 5, illustrating the stochastic
structure of the e-Marketing contract and the diﬀerences of the optimal strategies
for the two problems. Finally in Section 6, some concluding remarks are given.
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Throughout the paper, we use“ increasing” and“ decreasing” instead of“ non-
decreasing” and“ non-increasing” respectively for notational simplicity. Strictness
would be indicated explicitly whenever necessary, e.g. strictly increasing and strictly
concave.
2 Model Description
We consider an e-Marketing company, named Company X, which proposes to gen-
erate positive comments about products and services for its clients within speciﬁc
SNSs in a given time period [0; ¿ ]. More speciﬁcally, let SN be a group of social net-
work services and suppose Company Y is interested in promoting Product Z within
SN . Company X may then propose the following e-Marketing contract to Company
Y.
“Company X promises Company Y to generate Q positive comments
about Product Z within SN in [0; ¿ ]. For this service, Company Y
pays Company X by the amount of $®Q. Should the actual number
of positive comments exceed Q, the additional payment of $¯ for each
positive comment beyond Q would be paid to Company X by Company
Y. For controlling the risk of the actual number of positive comments to
appear within SN in [0; ¿ ] falling below Q, Company X pays the penalty
of $° for each shortage below Q to Company Y.”
Throughout the paper, we assume that the unit penalty is larger than the original
unit payment and the additional unit compensation is smaller than the original unit
payment, i.e.
° > ® > ¯ :(2.1)
In order to achieve the promised goal of generating Q positive comments within
SN in [0; ¿ ], Company X organizes a group of K bloggers, asking each of them to
use Product Z and to write a positive comment about it, if they agree, through
his/her blog with compensation of $c. The organized group of the bloggers would
play a role of pumping water for generating positive comments about Product Z.
The problem for Company X is then how to determine Q and K so as to optimize
its objective.
For formulating the decision problem of Company X more formally, let D be
a non-negative random variable which describes the number of positive comments
about Product Z to appear naturally within SN in [0; ¿ ] without any e-Marketing
eﬀorts. Throughout the paper, it is assumed that ¿ is short enough so that any
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interest can be ignored. Accordingly, the problem is considered as one-term problem
and ¿ is ignored in what follows. In addition, it is assumed that the mean of D
is ﬁnite but large enough for its distribution function to be approximated by an
absolutely continuous distribution function for analytical simplicity. We write
FD(x)
def= P [D · x] =
Z x
0
fD(y)dy ; ¹D
def= E[D] :(2.2)
The corresponding survival function is given by
F¯D(x)
def= P [D > x] = 1¡ FD(x) =
Z 1
x
fD(y)dy :(2.3)
Because of the existence of concavity built into the model, this assumption of ab-
solute continuity may be well approximated by employing rounding oﬀ or rounding
up non-integer numbers in solving the optimization problems of our interest, as we
will see.
Given K bloggers hired by Company X, let N(K) be the actual number of
positive comments about Product Z that appear within SN . We assume that
N(K) = v(K)D ;(2.4)
where v(K) is monotonically increasing and concave in K with v(0) = 1, i.e. there
would be no e-Marketing eﬀect if K = 0 and therefore N(0) = D. In parallel with
(2.2) and (2.3), let the distribution function and the survival function of N(K) be
deﬁned by
FN(K)(x) = P [N(K) · x] ; F¯N(K)(x) = P [N(K) > x] :(2.5)
From (2.4), it then follows that
FN(K)(x) = FD(
x
v(K)
) ; F¯N(K)(x) = F¯D(
x
v(K)
) :(2.6)
Let L(Q;K) denote the portion of the contract limited to the additional com-
pensation and the penalty for Company X. More speciﬁcally, we deﬁne
L(Q;K) = ¯[N(K)¡Q]+ ¡ °[Q¡N(K)]+(2.7)
where
[a]+ def= max f0; ag :(2.8)
The distribution function and the survival function of L(Q;K) are deﬁned as
HL(Q;K)(x) = P [L(Q;K) · x] ; H¯L(Q;K)(x) = P [L(Q;K) > x](2.9)
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with its expectation denoted by
¹L(Q;K)
def= E[L(Q;K)] :(2.10)
Let PRX(Q;K) be the random variable describing the proﬁt of Company X.
One ﬁnds that
PRX(Q;K) = ®Q¡ cK + L(Q;K) :(2.11)
In parallel with (2.9) and (2.10), we deﬁne
HPR:X(Q;K)(x) = P [PRX(Q;K) · x] ;(2.12)
H¯PR:X(Q;K)(x) = P [PRX(Q;K) > x]
and
¼X(Q;K)
def= E[PRX(Q;K)](2.13)
= ®Q¡ cK + ¹L(Q;K) ;
where the last equality holds from (2.10) and (2.11).
The ﬁrst problem we consider for Company X is to determine the optimal con-
tract quantity Q¤ and the optimal number of bloggers K¤ to be hired so as to
maximize ¼X(Q;K). Let @ be the set of non-negative integers. This problem can
then be described formally as
Problem 2.1 max
Q;K
¼X(Q;K) subject to Q;K 2 @ .
For notational convenience, we write
(Q¤;K¤) = arg max
Q;K
¼X(Q;K) subject to Q;K 2 @ :(2.14)
Alternatively, the underlying risk may be controlled by the VaR approach where
the probability of the proﬁt of Company X falling below v0 is minimized subject to
the expected proﬁt staying above v1. That is,
Problem 2.2 min
Q;K
´
subject to HPR:X(Q;K)(v0) · ´, ¼X(Q;K) ¸ v1; Q;K 2 @ .
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An optimal solution of Problem 2.2 is denoted by (Q¤¤;K¤¤) where
(Q¤¤;K¤¤) = arg min
Q;K
´(2.15)
subject to HPR:X(Q;K)(v0) · ´; ¼X(Q;K) ¸ v1; Q;K 2 @ :
In the next two sections, Problems 2.1 and 2.2 are analyzed in detail and computa-
tional procedures are developed for ﬁnding optimal solutions.
3 Optimal Strategy for Maximizing Expected Proﬁt
In order to study the basic properties of the expected proﬁt ¼X(Q;K) given in (2.13),
it is necessary to understand those of ¹L(Q;K) in (2.10), which is the expected
return of the portion of the contract limited to the additional compensation and
the penalty for Company X. We ﬁrst express ¹L(Q;K) in terms of the distribution
function and the survival function of D.
Theorem 3.1 Let ¹L(Q;K) be as in (2.10). One then has
¹L(Q;K) = v(K)
h
¯
Z 1
Q
v(K)
F¯D(x)dx¡ °
Z Q
v(K)
0
FD(x)dx
i
:
Proof From (2.5) and (2.7), it can be seen that
¹L(Q;K) = ¯
Z 1
Q
(x¡Q)dFN(K)(x)¡ °
Z Q
0
(Q¡ x)dFN(K)(x) ;
which in turn leads to
¹L(Q;K) = ¯
nR1
Q xdFN(K)(x)¡QF¯N(K)(Q)
o
(3.1)
¡°
n
QFN(K)(Q)¡
R Q
0 xdFN(K)(x)
o
:
By integration by parts, one sees thatZ 1
Q
xdFN(K)(x) = QF¯N(K)(Q) +
Z 1
Q
F¯N(K)(x)dx
and Z Q
0
xdFN(K)(x) = QFN(K)(Q)¡
Z Q
0
FN(K)(x)dx :
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Substituting these into (3.1) then yields
¹L(Q;K) = ¯
Z 1
Q
F¯N(K)(x)dx¡ °
Z Q
0
FN(K)(x)dx :(3.2)
The theorem now follows from (2.6). 2
Strict monotonicity and concavity of ¹L(Q;K) would be shown next.
Theorem 3.2 Let ¹L(Q;K) be as in (2.10). Given K ¸ 0, the following statements
hold true.
(a) ¹L(Q;K) is strictly decreasing and concave in Q.
(b) ¹L(Q;K) achieves 0 uniquely at Q0 satisfying
R1
Q0
v(K)
F¯D(x)dx = °¯
R Q0
v(K)
0 FD(x)dx.
Proof By diﬀerentiating (3.2) with respect to Q, one ﬁnds that
@
@Q
¹L(Q;K) = ¡
©
¯F¯N(K)(Q) + °FN(K)(Q)
ª
< 0 ;(3.3)
and the strict monotonicity of ¹L(Q;K) in Q follows. To prove concavity, we diﬀer-
entiate (3.3) one more time with respect to Q, yielding
(
@
@Q
)2¹L(Q;K) = ¡(° ¡ ¯)fN(K)(Q) :(3.4)
From (2.1), it can be seen that ° ¡ ¯ > 0 and hence ( @@Q)2¹L(Q;K) < 0 from (3.4),
proving part (a).
For part (b), we note from Theorem 3.1 that
lim
Q!0
¹L(Q;K) = v(K)¯¹D > 0 ; lim
Q!1
¹L(Q;K) = ¡1 :(3.5)
The strict monotonicity of ¹L(Q;K) proven in part (a) then implies the unique
existence of Q0 such that ¹L(Q0;K) = 0, and Q0 should satisfy
R1
Q0
v(K)
F¯D(x)dx =
°
¯
R Q0
v(K)
0 FD(x)dx from Theorem 3.1, completing the proof. 2
We next turn our attention to the basic properties of the expected proﬁt ¼X(Q;K),
which can be written from (2.13) and Theorem 3.1 as
¼X(Q;K) = ®Q¡ cK + v(K)
h
¯
Z 1
Q
v(K)
F¯D(x)dx¡ °
Z Q
v(K)
0
FD(x)dx
i
:(3.6)
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For notational convenience, the inverse function of FD is denoted by F¡1D so that
y = FD(x) implies x = F¡1D (y). We also deﬁne
»(®; ¯; °) def= F¡1D (
®¡ ¯
° ¡ ¯ ) ;(3.7)
where 0 < ®¡¯°¡¯ < 1 is assured from (2.1).
Theorem 3.3 Let ¼X(Q;K) be as in (2.13). Given K ¸ 0, the following statements
hold true.
(a) ¼X(Q;K) is strictly concave in Q.
(b) ¼X(Q;K) achieves the global maximum uniquely at Qmax(K) = v(K)»(®; ¯; °),
where »(®; ¯; °) is as given in (3.7).
Proof From (3.3), one sees that
@
@Q
¹L(Q;K) = ¡
©
¯ + (° ¡ ¯)FN(K)(Q)
ª
:(3.8)
Since @@Q¼X(Q;K) = ® +
@
@Q¹L(Q;K) from (2.13), substitution of (3.8) into this
equation along with (2.6) implies that
@
@Q
¼X(Q;K) = (®¡ ¯)
½
1¡ ° ¡ ¯
®¡ ¯FD(
Q
v(K)
)
¾
:(3.9)
By diﬀerentiating (3.9) with respect to Q once again, one ﬁnds that
(
@
@Q
)2¼X(Q;K) = ¡(° ¡ ¯) 1
v(K)
fD(
Q
v(K)
) < 0 ;(3.10)
where the last inequality results from (2.1) together with v(K) > 0 and fD(x) > 0,
proving part (a).
For part (b), the strict concavity of ¼X(Q;K) from part (a) implies that ¼X(Q;K)
achieves its global maximum uniquely at Qmax(K) at which @@Q¼X(Q;K) vanishes.
From (3.9), this observation leads to
1¡ ° ¡ ¯
®¡ ¯FD(
Qmax(K)
v(K)
) = 0 ;
or equivalently from (3.7),
Qmax(K) = v(K)»(®; ¯; °) ;(3.11)
proving the theorem. 2
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Given K ¸ 0, Theorem 3.3 states that ¼X(Q;K) achieves its global maximum
at Qmax(K) = v(K)»(®; ¯; °). In order to solve Problem 2.1, apart from the integer
constraints Q;K 2 @, it then suﬃces to maximize ¼X(Qmax(K);K) with respect to
K ¸ 0. In this regard, let
VX(K)
def= ¼X(Qmax(K);K) :(3.12)
The next theorem enables one to evaluate the unique maximum of VX(K) at Kmax.
For notational convenience, let G(z) be deﬁned by
G(z) = ®z + ¯
Z 1
z
F¯D(x)dx¡ °
Z z
0
FD(x)dx :(3.13)
Theorem 3.4 Let »(®; ¯; °), VX(K) and G(z) be as in (3.7), (3.12) and (3.13)
respectively. The following statements then hold true.
(a) VX(K) is strictly concave in K.
(b) VX(K) achieves the global maximum uniquely at Kmax =
¡
d
dK v
¢¡1( cG(»(®;¯;°))),
where
¡
d
dK v
¢¡1 is the inverse function of ddK v so that y = ddK v(K) implies K =¡
d
dK v
¢¡1(y).
Proof From Theorems 3.2 and 3.3 together with (2.13) and (3.12), one ﬁnds, after
a little algebra, that
VX(K) = v(K)G(»(®; ¯; °))¡ cK :(3.14)
It should be noted that G(»(®; ¯; °)) is independent of K. From (3.13), it can be
seen that
d
dz
G(z) = (®¡ ¯)£1¡ ° ¡ ¯
®¡ ¯FD(z)
¤
:(3.15)
Clearly, ddzG(z) is strictly decreasing in z with limz!0
d
dzG(z) = (® ¡ ¯) > 0 and
lim
z!1
d
dzG(z) = ¡(° ¡ ®) < 0. This observation along with (3.7) and (3.15) then
implies that ddzG(z) takes the value of 0 uniquely at z = »(®; ¯; °), which in turn
proves that G(z) is strictly concave in z having the unique global maximum at
z = »(®; ¯; °). From (3.13), it can be seen that lim
z!0
G(z) = ¯¹D > 0. One then
concludes that G(»(®; ¯; °)) > 0. Since v(K) is assumed to be strictly increasing
and concave in K, part (a) now follows by diﬀerentiating VX(K) in (3.14) twice with
respect to K.
From part (a), VX(K) achieves its global maximum at Kmax at which the ﬁrst
derivative vanishes. From (3.14), it can be readily seen that
d
dK
VX(K) =
d
dK
v(K)G(»(®; ¯; °))¡ c :(3.16)
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SinceG(»(®; ¯; °)) > 0 as shown above, part (b) can be proven by letting ddKVX(K) =
0 in (3.16), completing the proof. 2
Theorems 3.3 and 3.4 assure that
(Qmax(Kmax);Kmax) = arg max
Q;K
¼X(Q;K) :(3.17)
In order to cope with the integer constraints Q;K 2 @, we adopt the following
approximation. For a real number x, let dxe and bxc be the ceiling and the ﬂooring
of x, describing the smallest integer which is greater than or equal to x and the
largest integer which is less than or equal to x respectively. We then approximate
(Q¤;K¤) given in (2.14) by
¼X(Q¤;K¤) = max
8>>>><>>>>:
¼X(dQmax(Kmax)e; dKmaxe)
¼X(dQmax(Kmax)e; bKmaxc)
¼X(bQmax(Kmax)c; dKmaxe)
¼X(bQmax(Kmax)c; bKmaxc)
:(3.18)
An algorithmic procedure for solving Problem 2.1 can now be summarized as
follows.
Algorithm 3.1
[1] Calculate »(®; ¯; °) based on (3.7).
[2] Evaluate G(»(®; ¯; °)) from (3.13).
[3] Find Kmax from Theorem 3.4 (b).
[4] Compute Qmax(Kmax) from (3.11).
[5] Determine (Q¤;K¤) through (3.18) by computing ¼X(Q;K) from (3.6).
4 Optimal Strategy Based on Value at Risk Approach
When the distribution function of D has a long tail, the optimal strategy for maxi-
mizing the expected proﬁt could result in the probability of having the proﬁt below
v0 too high. One may contain this risk by trying to make the probability as low as
possible with compromise of keeping the expected proﬁt above v1 instead of pursu-
ing its maximum value. This approach, called the VaR approach, is formulated as
Problem 2.2 in Section 2.
In this section, we establish a computational foundation for ﬁnding the optimal
strategy (Q¤¤, K¤¤) for Problem 2.2. For this purpose, the ﬁrst step would be to
evaluate the distribution function HL(Q;K)(x) of L(Q;K) in terms of the distribution
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function of D. We deﬁne ±fStatementg = 1 if Statement is true, and ±fStatementg = 0
otherwise.
Theorem 4.1 Let HL(Q;K)(x) be as in (2.9). One then has
HL(Q;K)(x) = ±f¡°Q·x·0gFD
µ
1
v(K)
³x
°
+Q
´¶
(4.1)
+±fx¸0gFD
µ
1
v(K)
³x
¯
+Q
´¶
:
Proof By the law of total probability, we ﬁrst observe that
HL(Q;K)(x) = P [L(Q;K) · x]
= P [L(Q;K) · x; 0 · N(K) < Q] + P [L(Q;K) · x;Q · N(K)] :
From (2.7), the above equation then leads to
HL(Q;K)(x) = P [¡°(Q¡N(K)) · x; 0 · N(K) < Q] + P [¯(N(K)¡Q) · x;Q · N(K)] :
Arranging the expressions inside the probabilities with focus on N(K) and using
(2.4), one concludes that
HL(Q;K)(x) = P [D ·
1
v(K)
min
½
x
°
+Q;Q
¾
](4.2)
+ P [
Q
v(K)
· D · 1
v(K)
(
x
¯
+Q)] :
Since 0 · x° +Q < Q if and only if ¡°Q · x < 0, the ﬁrst probability on the right
hand side of (4.2) can be written as
P [D · 1
v(K)
min
½
x
°
+Q;Q
¾
] = ±f¡°Q·x<0gFD(
1
v(k)
(
x
°
+Q))(4.3)
+ ±fx¸0gFD(
Q
v(K)
) :
Similarly, for the second probability on the right hand side of (4.2), one sees that
P [
Q
v(K)
· D · 1
v(K)
(
x
¯
+Q)] = ±fx¸0g
£
FD(
1
v(k)
(
x
¯
+Q))¡ FD( Q
v(K)
)
¤
:(4.4)
The theorem now follows from (4.2), (4.3) and (4.4). 2
The next corollary is a direct consequence of Theorem 4.1.
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Corollary 4.2 Let HL(Q;K)(x) be as in (2.9). Then HL(Q;K)(x) is increasing in Q
and decreasing in K for any given real number x.
We are now in a position to evaluate the distribution function of the proﬁt of
Company X, i.e. HPR:X(Q;K)(x) = P [PRX(Q;K) · x] as in (2.12), which is of our
main concern in this section. From (2.11), it can be seen that
HPR:X(Q;K)(x) = HL(Q;K)(x¡ ®Q+ cK) :(4.5)
The next theorem is then immediate from Theorem 4.1 and (4.5). For notational
convenience, we deﬁne
T (x; ½;Q;K) =
x+ cK + (½¡ ®)Q
½v(K)
(4.6)
and
LE(Q;K) = ¡(° ¡ ®)Q¡ cK ; RE(Q;K) = ®Q¡ cK :(4.7)
Theorem 4.3
HPR:X(Q;K)(x) = ±fLE(Q;K)·x<RE(Q;K)gFD(T (x; °;Q;K))
+±fRE(Q;K)·xgFD(T (x; ¯;Q;K)) :
Theorem 4.3 provides a computational foundation for solving Problem 2.2 nu-
merically. Namely, one should ﬁnd the feasible region FR deﬁned by
FR = f(Q ;K );¼X (Q ;K ) ¸ v1g ;(4.8)
which is guaranteed to be compact, i.e. closed and bounded. By computingHPR:X(Q;K)(v0)
for (Q;K) 2 FR based on Theorem 4.3, the optimal solution (Q¤¤;K¤¤) achieving
the minimum value in FR could be found numerically.
5 Numerical Examples
In this section, the optimal strategy (Q¤;K¤) for Problem 2.1 and the optimal strat-
egy (Q¤¤;K¤¤) for Problem 2.2 are explored numerically. Throughout the section,
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we assume that the function v(K) introduced in (2.4) is given by
v(K) =
1 + rK
1 + wK
;(5.1)
where r > w. It then follows that
d
dK
v(K) =
r ¡ w
(1 + wK)2
> 0 ; (
d
dK
)2v(K) = ¡ 2(r ¡ w)w
(1 + wK)3
< 0 ;(5.2)
satisfying v(0) = 1 and v(K) is strictly increasing and concave in K, as assumed.
The inverse function of ddK v can be obtained from (5.2) explicitly. More speciﬁcally,
with & = ddK v(K), one has
K = (
d
dK
v)¡1(&) =
1
w
£rr ¡ w
&
¡ 1¤ :(5.3)
We also assume that the non-negative random variable D, describing the number
of positive comments about Product Z to appear naturally within SN without any
e-Marketing eﬀorts, is exponentially distributed with parameter ¸, that is
FD(x) = 1¡ e¡¸x ; F¯D(x) = e¡¸x; ¹D = 1
¸
:(5.4)
The inverse function F¡1D can then be expressed explicitly. With y = FD(x), one
has
x = F¡1D (y) = ¡
1
¸
log(1¡ y) :(5.5)
From Theorem 3.1, it can be seen, after a little algebra, that
¹L(Q;K) = v(K)
£¯ ¡ °
¸
e
¡¸ Q
v(K) + °(
1
¸
¡ Q
v(K)
)
¤
:(5.6)
From (2.13), the expected proﬁt ¼X(Q;K) is obtained accordingly as
¼X(Q;K) = ®Q¡ cK + v(K)
£¯ ¡ °
¸
e
¡¸ Q
v(K) + °(
1
¸
¡ Q
v(K)
)
¤
:(5.7)
Furthermore, »(®; ¯; °) in (3.7) can also be evaluated in a closed form, i.e.
»(®; ¯; °) = ¡ 1
¸
log(
° ¡ ®
° ¡ ¯ ) :(5.8)
The function G(z) in (3.13) and its value at z = »(®; ¯; °) are obtained as
G(z) =
°
¸
¡ (° ¡ ®)z ¡ ° ¡ ¯
¸
e¡¸z(5.9)
and
G(»(®; ¯; °)) =
®
¸
¡ (° ¡ ®)»(®; ¯; °) :(5.10)
Combining these results, Algorithm 3.1 can now be rewritten as follows.
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Algorithm 5.1
[1] Calculate »(®; ¯; °) = ¡ 1¸ log(°¡®°¡¯ ) .
[2] Evaluate G(»(®; ¯; °)) = ®¸ ¡ (° ¡ ®)»(®; ¯; °) .
[3] Obtain Kmax by
Kmax = ( ddK v)
¡1( cG(»(®;¯;°))) =
1
w
hq
(r¡w)G(»(®;¯;°))
c ¡ 1
i
.
[4] Compute Qmax(Kmax) by
Qmax(Kmax) = 1+rKmax1+wKmax »(®; ¯; °) .
[5] Determine (Q¤;K¤) through (3.18) by computing ¼X(Q;K) from (5.7).
For numerical examples to follow, the underlying parameter values employed are
as summarized in Table 1, unless speciﬁed otherwise. In Figure 5.1, the expected
proﬁt ¼X(Q;K) is plotted as a function of Q and K, where the optimal solution for
Problem 2.1 is found to be (Q¤;K¤) = (66028; 20) with ¼X(Q¤;K¤) = 11859. In
Figures 5.2 and 5.3, the marginal functions ¼X(Q;K¤) and ¼X(Q¤;K) are depicted
respectively. We observe that ¼X(Q;K¤) is strictly concave in Q as proven in Theo-
rem 3.3. For the basic set of the parameter values, the model seems to be insensitive
with respect to K for K > 10. Figure 5.4 illustrates VX(K) = ¼X(Qmax(K);K),
where the strict concavity in K can be observed as expected from Theorem 3.4 (a).
Table 1: Basic Set of Parameter Values
® 0.2
¯ 0.1
° 0.3
c 30
r 50
w 1
¸ 0.0005
v0 5000
v1 10000
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Figure 5.1: Expected Proﬁt ¼X(Q;K)
Figure 5.2: Marginal Function ¼X(Q;K¤) of Q
Figure 5.3: Marginal Function ¼X(Q¤;K) of K
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Figure 5.4: VX(K)
In our model, the two key parameters would be ® and c, where the former is
the unit revenue per promised positive comment for Company X to receive from
Company Y, while the latter is the cost paid to each blogger by Company X. In
Figures 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7, the optimal solutions K¤, Q¤ and the associated optimal
expected proﬁt ¼X(Q¤;K¤) are plotted on the ® ¡ c plane. As one may expect,
we observe that K¤ is increasing in ®, that is, the higher the unit revenue is, the
more bloggers Company X can aﬀord to hire. In the opposite way, the higher the
cost for each blogger is, the less number of bloggers Company X can aﬀord to hire,
and K¤ is decreasing in c. If c becomes larger than 20 or so, Company X reaches
the aﬀordable level and K¤ becomes almost constant. We ﬁnd similar monotonicity
properties for Q¤. However, Q¤ is very sensitive to ® but quite insensitive to c,
while K¤ is quite sensitive to c for 0 < c · 10 but rather insensitive to ®. The
monotonicity properties of ¼X(Q¤;K¤) are also in parallel with those of K¤ and
Q¤. However, it is surprisingly insensitive to c, while it increases fairly rapidly as ®
increases.
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Figure 5.5: K¤
Figure 5.6: Q¤
Figure 5.7: ¼X(Q¤;K¤)
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We next demonstrate how Problem 2.2 can be solved numerically. Given v0 =
5000 and v1 = 10000, Figures 5.8 and 5.9 depict ¼X(Q;K) and HPR:X(Q;K)(v0)
respectively for (Q;K) 2 FR = f(Q;K);¼X(Q;K) ¸ v1g. In order to see the struc-
ture better, these graphs are projected onto the Q¡K plane with contour lines in
Figures 5.10 and 5.11. Here, the contour lines in the former ﬁgure indicate climbing
up the hill to the top, whereas those in the latter ﬁgure represent going down the
valley to the bottom. By reducing the mesh size at the bottom, one ﬁnds the optimal
solution (Q¤¤;K¤¤) = (27000; 13) with step size of 1000 for Q. The corresponding
values for HPR:X(Q¤¤;K¤¤)(v0) and ¼X(Q¤¤;K¤¤) are 0:25 and 10897 respectively. We
note that the maximum value ¼X(Q¤;K¤) is 11859 at (Q¤;K¤) = (66028; 20), where
HPR:X(Q¤;K¤)(v0) = 0:55.
Figure 5.8: ¼X(Q;K) for (Q;K) 2 FR
Figure 5.9: HPR:X(Q;K)(v0) for (Q;K) 2 FR
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 
Figure 5.10: ¼X(Q;K) for (Q;K) 2 FR
 

Figure 5.11: HPR:X(Q;K)(v0) for (Q;K) 2 FR
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, a new e-Marketing contract structure is proposed, where the contract
would be exchanged between an e-Marketing company, named Company X, and a
manufacturing company, named Company Y, which is to promote Product Z within
SN . The structure of the contract is as follows.
“Company X promises Company Y to generate Q positive comments
about Product Z within SN . For this service, Company Y pays Com-
pany X by the amount of $®Q. Should the actual number of positive
comments exceed Q, the additional payment of $¯ for each positive com-
ment beyond Q would be paid to Company X by Company Y. For con-
trolling the risk of the actual number of positive comments to appear
within SN falling below Q, Company X pays the penalty of $° for each
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shortage below Q to Company Y.”
In order to achieve the promised goal of generating Q positive comments within
SN , Company X organizes a group of K bloggers, asking each of them to use
Product Z and to write a positive comment about it, if they agree, through his/her
blog with compensation of $c. The organized group of the bloggers would play a role
of pumping water for generating positive comments about Product Z. The problem
for Company X is then how to determine Q and K so as to optimize its objective.
Two types of problems are considered, where the ﬁrst problem is to maximize
the expected proﬁt of Company X while the second problem is based on the VaR
approach to minimize the probability of the proﬁt of Company X falling below v0
subject to having the expected proﬁt above v1. Although this problem has a ﬂavor of
the classical news vendor problem, it is more diﬃcult because of its two dimensional
nature. For the ﬁrst problem, the exact optimal solution is derived apart from
the integer constraints and an algorithmic procedure is developed for computing
the optimal solution. For the second problem, it is shown that the distribution
function of the proﬁt of Company X can be given explicitly, thereby providing a
computational foundation for solving the problem. Numerical examples are given,
illustrating the stochastic structure of the e-Marketing contract and the diﬀerences
of the optimal strategies for the two problems.
This research is new and many key issues remain unaddressed. Some of such key
issues include:
1) Eﬀects of the distribution function of D which is non-exponential
2) Exact analysis of the integer approximation of the optimal solutions
3) Properties of the optimal solutions as a function of the underlying
parameters
4) Development of computational algorithms for ﬁnding the optimal so-
lution of
Problem 2.2 based on the VaR approach
5) Economic merits of Company Y to be incorporated explicitly in the
model
6) Broad issues concerning the proposed e-Marketing contract structure
and
stealth marketing.
These issues will be addressed in due course and will be reported elsewhere.
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